The
Trent Affair of 1861
by
Major W.E. Campbell
In his book, Canada's
Soldiers, Lieutenant-Colonel George F.G. Stanley
used the sub-title "The Military History of an Unmilitary
People" to describe the general lack of interest in
military affairs that is characteristic of most Canadians. However, as he ably described in his book, military operations
and considerations have shaped the very fabric of
Canadian society.
Unfortunately, many of these facts have been
virtually forgotten as the role of the military in
the development of our country has been downplayed.
One of these "almost forgotten" episodes is
the Trent Affair, which occurred during the first
year of the American Civil War, and almost embroiled
Canada in the American Civil War.
The military response to the Trent Affair was
the mounting and deployment of a force of over 11,500
troops across the winter storm tossed North Atlantic.
A group of 6,818 of them was then moved 309
miles by sleigh, in sub-zero temperatures, across
New Brunswick to the Saint Lawrence and then on by
rail to Quebec and Montreal. This feat deserves to be remembered and this article will attempt
to do this.
When the American Civil War broke out in 1861,
the troop strength in British North America was at
a low ebb. While
it had been increased somewhat from the record low
that occurred when forces were stripped away for duty
in the Crimea, it was still below the traditional
level which was parity with the regular U.S. Army.
Using a "good fences = good neighbours"
philosophy, Canada (present-day Ontario and Quebec)
was reinforced by three battalions of infantry and
a battery of field artillery during the summer of
1861. A
long-standing goal of some Northern U.S. politicians
was to add Canada to the Union.
Thus there was a real concern that the Union
Forces would move north after their anticipated quick
victory over the Confederate States.
This led to the rapid expansion of the Volunteer
movement within British North America. In September
1861, Canada asked the British Government to provide
100,000 stands of arms for these Volunteers.
It was not until late October that they agreed
to send 25,000 stands but decided not to ship them
until the Spring.
Winter was approaching and they could not be
made ready in time to load as the last ship of the
season was scheduled to sail on 5 November. Prophetic words indeed!
This period of cautious tension was abruptly
broken on 8 November 1861 when the USS SAN JACINTO
boarded the British mail steamer TRENT in the Bermuda
passage and forcibly removed two Confederate Commissioners
who were enroute to Britain and France.
This precipitated the "Trent Affair".
The British Government and people were enraged
by this violation of the laws of the sea and British
neutrality. The
situation was further inflamed by the obvious American
glee in having twisted the lion's tail!
War was almost a certainty.
While demands for the release of the Commissioners
were made and the dying Prince Consort, Albert, tried
to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis, the
British War Office made plans for the immediate dispatch
of reinforcements to British North America.
The plan was quickly implemented.
News of the "Trent Affair" did not
reach London until 28 November, the decision to reinforce
Canada was made on 6 December and the first troops
had sailed by 7 December.
The campaign plan was highly flexible.
If required, an invasion of the U.S. would
be conducted using the two traditional routes, which
were south from the Niagara Peninsula and from Montreal
via Lake Champlain.
These forces, operating in conjunction with
the Royal Navy which would blockade the Atlantic ports,
would split the Northern States in half.
These efforts, combined with those of the Confederate
States, would have likely resulted in a speedy victory.
Otherwise, the plan was to defend the border
against possible Northern aggression.
The local militia forces would have been used
to augment the British regulars as needed.
The first group of forces to deploy was designed
to bolster the defences of British North America pending
the arrival of a larger force in the Spring, prior
to the start of the campaigning season, and to guard
against an early Spring offensive by the North.
The troops destined for Nova Scotia Command
(present day New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince
Edward Island) could come directly by sea.
However, the majority of the force was to go
to Canada and this presented the greatest problem.
The shipping season in the Saint Lawrence had
closed in late November as had the lighthouses and
other aides to navigation.
It was hoped that ships could get as far up
the Saint Lawrence River as Rivière du Loup,
which was the Eastern Terminus of the Grand Trunk
Railway, or Bic which is about 54 miles below Rivière
du Loup. If
this was not possible, the ships were to divert to
Halifax. The
troops would then proceed to Saint John and, from
there, go overland to Rivière du Loup where
they would take the train to Quebec City, Montreal
and points as far west as London, CW.
Although it was a quickly planned deployment,
it was not poorly planned!
The War Office had learned the lessons from
the Crimean War and the disastrous winter of 1854/55.
Officers with experience in Canada were extensively
consulted, as was Florence Nightingale who gave valuable
advice on the health and sanitation of the troops
during a winter march.
A retired Commissariat officer, who had made
the arrangements for the march of the 43rd, 85th and
34th Regiments during the winter of 1837/38, made
many suggestions that were incorporated into the final
plan.
Hectic preparations took place in the United
Kingdom as troops were warned for duty, ships were
chartered and supplies of warlike stores such as weapons,
ammunition, camp stores and uniforms for both the
British troops and the militia of British North America
were readied for shipment.
The winter voyage across the storm tossed North
Atlantic was fraught with danger.
Troop ships and their escorts were separated
by the bad weather.
Most of the ships chartered were side-paddle
steamers which limited their ability to navigate the
ice which they would encounter in the approaches to
the Saint Lawrence River and their engines were prone
to storm damage.
The newspapers of the day reported the PARANA,
with a thousand troops on board, overdue and feared
lost but fortunately this was not true.
Besides having a slow passage, she had run
aground on a sandbank during a snow squall, subsequently
floated free on the next tide and eventually reached
Halifax. Only one ship, the PERSIA, actually made it up the Saint Lawrence
as far as Bic.
As the men of the 1st Battalion of the 16th
Regiment were being disembarking, a rush of ice came
down river and she quickly had to put to sea.
A company of infantry was left on board and
a portion of the crew was left on shore!
The soldiers helped to man the ship until she
could reach Halifax.
The ship carrying the bulk of the 96th
Regiment had to put back to England after two attempts
due to damage. The Regiment was commended by the Admiralty for its efforts
in helping to save the ship!
A total of sixteen ships were chartered, some
of which made more than one voyage.
By the end of December 1861, the harbour of
Halifax was filling up with troop ships.
The next problem was the onwards movement of
those troops which were destined for Canada.
At Halifax, the military staff under the Commander,
Major General Sir Hastings Doyle, had been working
on this. The
normal winter route to Canada was by the railway from
Maine to Montreal.
Given the pending war, this was not an acceptable
option. While
the basic plan was that the troops would be conveyed
to Saint John, there were two options for their onward
movement. The
first choice was the tried and true one up the Saint
John River to present day Edmundston and then overland
to Rivière du Loup.
An alternate route, which used the rail link
from Saint John to Shediac and then went by road to
Campbellton and overland to Métis on the Saint
Lawrence, was investigated but discarded. So,
while the troops were crossing the Atlantic, the military
staff was busy arranging for transportation, lodgings
and food along the Saint John River route.
The desire to use modern methods of transportation
was quite evident.
A portion of the Saint Andrews and Quebec Railway
had been built from Saint Andrews to Canterbury and
it was initially thought that this would be the best
way to move the troops as far as Woodstock.
However, this did not work out as the railway
proved to be unequal to the task due to the cold weather
and the quantity of snow on the tracks.
The route, as finally used, ran overland from
Saint John to Fredericton, then along the West Bank
to Grand Falls where it crossed over the suspension
bridge to the East Bank, and onwards to Little Falls
(Edmundston) before going North to Fort Ingall and
then over the "Grand Portage" to Rivière
du Loup. Baring
weather delays, it took ten days to complete the journey
by sleigh. Nine
overnight stops were arranged and these were manned
by detachments of the Military Train, Army Hospital
Corps and the Commissariat Staff Corps. Food was purchased locally although the Commissary set up bakeries
at Grand Falls and Fort Ingall.
An advanced headquarters was established at
Saint John to control the movement of the troops.
The 1st Bn Military Train was charged with
the management of the transportation.
The contract for this had been arranged by
Assistant Commissary General Mahon at Fredericton
and was awarded to three contractors who divided the
route into three stages (Saint John to Fredericton,
Fredericton to Little Falls and Little Falls to Rivière
du Loup). These
contractors provided roughly constructed two-horsed
sleighs, which were capable of holding eight men facing
each other.
The
Guards, being larger men, could only put six in each
one. Each
sleigh was provided with a small repair kit consisting
of a saw, hammer, nails, clasp knife and cord for
repairs or emergencies on the road plus an allocation
of snow shovels and snowshoes.
Many of the drivers and horses were normally
employed in the lumber trade, or were local farmers,
and so were familiar with the winter conditions that
would be encountered. Similar sleighs were provided for the carriage of the eighteen
Armstrong guns of the three Field Batteries.
The troops were divided into packets of approximately
160 men for movement. A typical packet consisted of
a sleigh with half of the officers, baggage sleighs
with an escort, sleighs with the main body of troops
and the last sleigh with the remaining half of the
officers. Prior to departing England, each soldier
was provided with cold weather clothing consisting
of: furcaps with ear lappets, woollen comforters,
chamois waistcoats, a flannel shirt and drawers, warm
gloves, a pair of long boots and thick woollen stockings.
The men of the Military Train were also issued a pea
jacket. In addition to this, the men were issued moccasins
at Saint John and the contractors provided straw and
buffalo robes for use in the sleighs. For further
warmth, the men were provided with hot meals at breakfast,
midday and supper. They were also encouraged to run
alongside the sleighs in shifts to maintain circulation.
Medical officers travelled with most groups and others
were located at each of the halts.
The route had improved considerably since the
previous deployments over it.
It now followed an established road.
The part through New Brunswick was not good
as it was in poor repair whilst the portion in Canada
was well kept.
Snow ploughs and rollers were used to keep
it open during the bad weather. Where
possible the troops were billeted in existing buildings
such as houses, hotels, warehouses or barns. They
were fortunate to be able to use the barracks in Saint
John and Fredericton and the abandoned post at Fort
Ingall was refurbished.
It was only at Petersville and St. Francis
that temporary long, low log buildings called "cabanos"
had to be build for shelter. The officers stayed in nearby hotels or private homes.
During the march of the 104th Regiment in the
winter of 1813, a company had been storm delayed in
the area between Fort Ingall and Rivière du
Loup, and so reserve stores of food were made to guard
against this possibility.
All told, the force had a much easier trip
than the 104th had in 1813 when they had to march
on foot pulling toboggans!
The following table shows the details of the
route and the overnight stopping places that were
set up:
| ROUTE
OF THE OVERLAND MARCH |
| Day
|
Distance
|
Location
|
Remarks |
|
0
|
0 (
0)
| Saint
John
| Controlling
Headquarters. Major General Rumley commanding.
|
|
1
|
30 ( 30)
| Petersville
|
|
|
2
|
30 ( 60)
| Fredericton
|
|
|
3
|
29 ( 89)
| Dumfries
|
|
|
4
|
32 (121)
| Woodstock
|
|
|
5
|
23 (144)
| Florenceville
|
|
|
6
|
26 (170)
| Tobique
(Andover)
|
|
|
7
|
24 (194)
| Grand
Falls
|
|
|
8
|
36 (230)
| Little
Falls
(Edmundston)
|
|
|
| Mid-day
stop
| Degele
(Degèlis)
|
|
|
9
|
37 (267)
| Fort
Ingall (Cabano)
| Rations
for 200 men for 30 days stocked here.
|
|
| Mid-day
stop
| St.
Francis
| Rations
for 200 men for 5 days stocked here
|
| 10
|
42 (309)
| Rivière
du Loup
| Transfer
to Grand Trunk Railway. |
Troops
began leaving Halifax for Saint John on 1 January
1862. The
first of these was the 62nd Regiment, which was headquartered
in Halifax with detachments in Fredericton, Saint
John and Saint John's.
They, along with an ad hoc battery of field
artillery and a third of the 1st Battalion of the
Military Train, sailed from Saint John to Saint Andrews
where they went by train to Canterbury and then by
sleigh to Woodstock and onwards.
Their role was to secure the route from any
possible American interference, especially by units
of the Northern Army at Houlton, Maine and to garrison
the stopping places if required.
Had it been necessary, they would have been
supported by the 1st Battalion of the Rifle Brigade.
Fortunately this was not necessary as the crisis
had subsided by the end of December and the Confederate
Commissioners were released on 9 January 1862.
The troops who were already en route continued
but any new departures from Britain were halted.
By
mid-January, the Saint Andrews option had been abandoned
and the troops were leaving directly from Saint John.
The command and control of the move was quite
simple. Although
the route crossed the border between the Nova Scotia
and Canada Commands, it was decided that the overland
portion of the move from Saint John to Rivière
du Loup would be commanded by Nova Scotia Command
from a headquarters located in Saint John vice Halifax.
Canada Command would then be responsible for
the entraining and onward movement to Quebec, Montreal
and more Westerly locations. The movement
of the troops was regulated by the use of the telegraph.
This necessitated the speedy establishment
of telegraph offices at any of the nightly stops that
did not already have one.
The officers in charge of the groups of troops
would report in every evening. Based on this information, their travel could be controlled
and delayed if preceding groups were held up by storms
as did occasionally happen.
Further control was exercised by staff officers
who constantly moved up and down the route in express
sleighs. By
13 March 1862, the last group of troops had cleared
Rivière du Loup.
In all, 274 Officers and 6544 NCOs, Rank and
File passed along the route.
This included the guns and equipment of the
three field batteries of artillery, which would obtain
their horses once in Canada.
The two battalions of the Military Train would
also acquire their horses and waggons in Canada. There
was also an unrecorded quantity of military stores.
Curiously, the rate at which the force was moved along
the route was not dictated by availability of sleighs
but by the ability of the GTR to provide railcars
at Rivière du Loup. The cost of transporting
the troops was found to be no more expensive than
the cost of an equivalent move using the British rail
system. It
is recorded that the troops were received with great warmth and kindness
all along their route, which greatly eased their passage.
The following is a list of the regiments and
other units that made the overland march to Canada
during the winter of 1861/62:
Infantry
1st Battalion Grenadier Guards
2nd Battalion Scots Fusilier Guards
one company 1st Battalion 16th (Bedfordshire)
Regiment
62nd (Wiltshire) Regiment
63rd (West Suffolk) Regiment
1st Battalion The Rifle Brigade
Artillery
E, F, and G Batteries 4th Brigade Field Artillery
Numbers 5 and 6 Batteries 7th Brigade Garrison
Artillery
Numbers 1, 4, 5 and 6 Batteries 10th Brigade
Garrison Artillery
Engineers
Number 15 and 18 Companies Royal Engineers
Support Corps and Others
56 Cavalry Instructors for Cavalry and Volunteers
1st and 3rd Battalions Military Train
Detachments of Medical Officers and men of
the Army Hospital Corps
Detachments
of Commissariat Officers and men of the Commissariat
Staff Corps
When planning the move, there were three main
considerations: enemy, weather and desertion. Fortunately,
there was no enemy threat as the Trent Crisis had
subsided by the end of December and the North had
decided to release the Confederate Commissioners.
However, it was decided to continue with the deployment
of the tasked troops but additional forces that had
been warned were stood down. The North graciously
offered to allow the force to use the Portland, Maine
to Montreal railway link. The British Authorities
prudently declined this offer. However the Staff,
who had sailed on a "lame duck" ship which
took 29 days to reach Halifax vice the normal 12 or
13, did not reach Halifax until 5 January 1862. As
they had to quickly reach Canada, they prudently covered
up their military baggage labels and took the next
Cunard Mail Steamer to Boston and then the U.S. railway
to Montreal.
Because of the excellent medical arrangements,
there were few casualties during the move. Not more
than 70 men were admitted to the hospitals en route.
Only two died as the result of disease and another
two died due to excess drinking. Of the eleven cases
of frostbite, only one was serious and that was because
it was combined with excessive drinking. Although
temperatures of as low as -25 degrees Fahrenheit were
recorded, it was considered to be a mild winter as
there was little wind. While there were some delays
due to weather, the only serious one was caused by
a blizzard on 21/23 January. Desertion was also minimal.
The "crimps" were very active along the
Maine - New Brunswick border. There was a great demand
for trained soldiers in the Union Army. British soldiers
were offered tempting bounties and promotion if they
would desert and enlist in the Union army. The town
of Tobique (present day Andover) was a particular
hot bed for this. The Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick
called out the militia to help guard against the "crimps"
as well to assist with the movement of the troops.
The officers travelling in each of the packets were
specially charged to be on their guard. All told,
there were only nine desertions, three of these being
at Tobique.
Once in Canada, the employment of the troops
was non-eventful.
Although the threat of invasion by the North
had dissipated, a defensive posture was maintained. There was a reduction in the force level in Canada during the
summer of 1862.
By the Fall of 1862, the force had been divided
into three manoeuvre groups.
The group based in London, Ontario could counter
any intrusions along the Detroit/Windsor border and
reinforce operations along the Niagara border.
Similarly, the one based in Toronto could support
the Niagara frontier or move East to Kingston or even
Montreal. The
third group, which made up the bulk of the force including
a Brigade of Guards, was in Montreal and could block
any moves up the historic Richeleau River invasion
route in addition to moving either West or East along
the Saint Lawrence River.
Each of these manoeuvre groups consisted of
a battalion or more of infantry, a battery or two
of field artillery, perhaps a company of engineers
and, for mobility, at least a troop of the Military
Train. For
operations, they would have been reinforced by militia
infantry, artillery and cavalry as required.
There was another manoeuvre group based in
New Brunswick, which could counter any initial attacks
across the Maine border.
Had difficulties occurred here, this group
could have been swiftly reinforced from Halifax and
have been supported by the Royal Navy.
In addition to mounting guards and training
themselves, the regular army garrisons were also used
to train the units of the growing Canadian Volunteer
Militia. Regular
officers instructed at the Military Schools that had
been established in 1864.
Beginning in 1865, the British Regulars ran
Militia Camps of Instruction were held in various
locations such as La Prairie and Fredericton.
When not on duty, a popular activity amongst
the officers was to visit the Union and Confederate
armies in the field.
One of the first to do this was Colonel Clark-Kennedy,
the Colonel-Commandant of the Military Train, when
he visited the Union Army of the Potomac in February
1862. After
his visit to the Army of Northern Virginia, Lieutenant
Colonel Wolseley thought that a division of regular
troops acting in consort with either side would turn
the tide of the war.
At that time, a British division consisted
of between ten and twelve regiments of infantry, which
was fairly close to the force that the British had
in Canada.
The effort expended in training the Volunteer
Militia was greatly repaid in the following years
when they were called out to patrol the border when
relations with the North were again strained by Confederate
Agents using Canada as a base for raids against the
North and when the Fenians threatened Canada in 1866
and 1870. Many
of the British units that had deployed in response
to the "Trent Affair" were still in Canada
and provided valuable service during both the Fenian
Raids and the Red River Expedition of 1870.
Defence was one of the major unifying factors
that brought the British Colonies in North America
into Confederation in 1867.
The British Forces, by their presence and by
their training of the militia, made a significant
contribution to the defence of both Canada and the
Maritime Provinces as they responded to the threats
posed by the American Civil War, the Fenians and the
rebellion in the Red River District.
In retrospect, it is not surprising that the
Trent Affair is an almost forgotten event. No blood
was spilled during it and, once in British North America,
the troops had a fairly easy go of it. One of the
greatest hazards that the young officers faced was
avoiding the charms of the Belles of Montreal. However,
their winter deployment across the Atlantic and the
sleigh ride through New Brunswick is another matter.
I am not aware of a similar feat in British military
history. Hopefully, this article has shed a bit of
light on the otherwise bland remarks in regimental
histories or soldier's papers to the effect that they
served in Canada or Nova Scotia - 1862.
References:
The
Predecessors of the Royal Army Service Corps
by Lt Col C.H. Massè MC
A
Victorian Soldier and his Times
by Lt Col A.E. Clark-Kennedy
Report
on Army Health for 1862
(Canada portion) as kindly provided by Capt (Retd)
P.H. Starling, R.A.M.C. Historical Museum
The
Story of a Soldiers Life
by Field Marshall Viscount Wolseley
Our
Garrisons in the West
by Lt Francis Duncan RA
Illustrated
London News.
Various editions 1861 and 1862
Facey-Crowther,
David. The New Brunswick Militia, 1787 - 1867.
Fredericton: New Ireland Press, 1990.
Senior,
Elinor Kyte. Roots of the Canadian Army: Montreal
District 1846 - 1870. Montreal: Society of the
Montreal Military & Maritime Museum, 1981.
Stanley,
George F.G. Canada's Soldiers - The Military History
of an Unmilitary People. Toronto: MacMillan Company,
